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SYSTEMIC EMPATHY

by Michael J. Zimmer*
Empathy, n. the ability to understand and share the feelings of
another.

In Professor Terry Smith's article, Everyday Indignities: Race,
Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, he calls for the development, within

the structure of Title VII retaliation law, of greater tolerance toward and
understanding of the stresses endured by people of color. 2 Smith's claim is that
those who suffer retaliation for opposing employment discrimination may act
out their stress in ways that some may consider unconventional. 3 I agree with
Smith that the system of antidiscrimination law lacks sufficient tolerance, not
only for victims of retaliation, but for victims of discrimination more generally.
More precisely, the system lacks empathy for victims of discrimination. Part I
of this response explores why the law currently lacks empathy. Part II then
considers why sympathy for African Americans and other traditional victims of
discrimination has declined. Part III sets the stage for my proposal that judges
ought to adopt an approach to victims of discrimination rooted in what I call
"systemic empathy." Finally, Part IV explores how the existence of
discrimination can be used to educate judges in the hopes that they will develop
this sort of empathy.

*
Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. My thanks to Mara Timourian,
Class of 2004, for her excellent research assistance.

I.

The New Oxford American Dictionary 557 (2001).

2.
Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev 529 (2003).
3.
Id. at 534. Other recent works looking at subtle employment discrimination from
different aspects includes Tristin Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 91 (2003), and
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A StructuralApproach, 101 Colum.
L. Rev. 458 (2001).
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WHY ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW LACKS SUFFICIENT EMPATHY

Before discussing the legal system's treatment of discrimination and
the operation of the antidiscrimination laws, it might be helpful to outline the
history of how the American legal system has treated workers generally. Simply
put, it has treated workers poorly. Without explicitly saying so, the original
Constitution countenanced race-based slavery and did not allow women to be
full participants in society.4 Much of the labor force was not free, and the law
played an important part in maintaining that oppressive system.5 In addition,
6
many workers who were not slaves were nonetheless indentured servants.
In the nineteenth century, the conspiracy doctrine, a doctrine deeply
suspicious of all forms of collective action, governed labor relations.7
Essentially, the system did not even allow workers to try to alter the conditions
under which they worked. For example, in 1805, the journeymen shoemakers of
Philadelphia went on strike for higher wages, leading to the arrest, prosecution,
and conviction of the strike leaders for the common law crime of conspiracy. 8
In Commonwealth v. Hunt,9 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
in an opinion by Justice Lemuel Shaw, took a step toward legitimizing
collective action by refusing to find the formation of worker associations
criminal conspiracies per se. However, that decision did not set workers free to
organize. In place of threats of criminal prosecution came the labor injunction,

4.

Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 4-5 (3d ed. 2000).

5.

See Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (1974).

Eugene Genovese argues that: "In southern slave society, as in other societies, the law, even
narrowly defined as a system of institutionalized jurisprudence, constituted a principle vehicle for

the hegemony of the ruling class .... The slave-holders as a socio-economic class shaped the legal
system to their interests." Id. at 26-27.
6.

See generally, Bruce Laurie, Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth-Century

America (1997) (suggesting that the American working-class developed differently from their
European counterparts because the ideology of radicalism lasted much longer in the United States,
and industrialists antipathetic to unions were supported by state and local governments that were
also hostile to organized labor).
7.
See Victoria C. Hattam, Courts and the Question of Class: JudicialRegulation ofLabor
Under the Common Law Doctrineof Criminal Conspiracy,in Labor Law in America: Historical and
Critical Essays 44 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992) (discussing the

development of labor law from its origins in the common law doctrine of conspiracy).
8.
Id. Hattam notes that, "[i]n convicting the journeymen of conspiracy, the judge followed
English common law precedent. However, the judge was unable to provide a way to distinguish
lawful combinations from unlawful combinations, leaving future courts vulnerable to charges of
judicial arbitrariness." Id. at 52.
9.

45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 134 (1842).
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used to restrain workers' collective action for their own benefit. In
Massachusetts, picketing by workers was held to be intimidating and coercive
and, therefore, subject to injunction. 10 The Sherman Antitrust Act, 11 supposedly
aimed at busting business monopolies, came to be a source of federal law for
enjoining workers' collective acts, as courts viewed collective activity as a
"combination... or conspiracy in restraint of trade." 12 In Loewe v. Lawlor, the
Supreme Court approved an application of the Sherman Act that enjoined
secondary collective action by workers.' 3 With the Clayton Act of 1914,
Congress amended the Sherman Act to instruct the federal courts that labor was
not a commodity and that labor unions, therefore, were no longer to be subject
to the antitrust laws. 1 4 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court gave the Clayton Act a
narrow reading and legitimated the continued application of the antitrust lawsand therefore injunctions-in labor cases.' 5 In 1932, Congress took another stab6
at the application of antitrust laws on unions with the Norris-LaGuardia Act.1
This law attempted to remove from the
7 jurisdiction of federal courts the power
to issue injunctions in labor disputes.'
By 1935, with the passage of the Wagner Act, 18 the focus of federal
labor policy shifted sharply. It shifted from the goal expressed in NorrisLaGuardia-of protecting workers from untoward regulation by hostile federal
judges-to a starkly different goal, that of using federal law as a vehicle for
bringing about protective collective bargaining. 19 In addition, labor policy
adopted the new goal of protecting workers generally in the exercise of their
collective rights. Section 13 of the Wagner Act, as originally enacted, protects
the right to strike as follows: "Nothing in this Act. .. shall be construed so as
either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
10.

Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896).

11.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).

12.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).

13.

208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908).

14.

15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000).

15.

Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).

16.

29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (2000).

17.
Even after that, the Supreme Court interpreted the Norris-LaGuardia Act narrowly to
allow federal courts to issue labor injunctions where a collective bargaining agreement with an
arbitration clause has been breached by a strike. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
18.
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000)).
19.
As evidence of this shift, compare the statement of policy in the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
29 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), with the statement of policy in the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
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strike.... ,,20 Section 7 of the Wagner Act affirmatively protects employees
who strike (i.e., "who engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining"), as a means of pressuring their employers to agree to
an employee for
collective bargaining agreements. 2' It is clear that discharging
22
going out on an economic strike violates the Wagner Act.
Early on, however, workers were again constrained in their exercise of
their collective rights by narrow interpretations of the Wagner Act. For
example, in the 1938 case of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., the
Supreme Court stated summarily that employees who went out on economic
strike-quitting work collectively in order to pressure the employer to agree to
a collective bargaining agreement-faced the risk of permanent replacement by
their employers.23 Permanent replacement operates in nearly the same manner
as discharge. The only difference between them is that permanently replaced
workers remain employees under Section 2(3) of the Wagner Act and stay on a
preferential recall list.2 4 Once a striker unconditionally applies for
reinstatement, she should be reinstated once a vacancy opens for which she is
qualified.2 5 If, however, the economic striker finds substantially equivalent
employment elsewhere in the meantime, the employer no longer has a duty to
recall the striker.26 Because few workers have the means to remain unemployed
for long in hopes that vacancies will occur at their prior place of employment, it
must be assumed that most economic strikers who are permanently replaced
will eventually lose their jobs.27 Because permanently replaced employees are
in the same position as discharged employees, permanent replacement, like
discharge, should violate the Wagner Act.
20.

29 U.S.C. § 163.

21.
29 U.S.C. § 157. As originally enacted it provided that "[e]mployees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Id.
22.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 700 F.2d 575, 576-77 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that
Section 8(a)(3) of the Wagner Act prohibits an employer from discouraging union employment in
its hiring, firing, or tenure practices).
23.

304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).

24.

NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 381 (1967).

25.

Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 103 (7th Cir. 1969).

26.

FleetwoodTrailer Co., 389 U.S. at 381.

Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. at 345-46 ("[An employer] is not bound to
27.
discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of [strikers] to resume their
employment, in order to create places for them."); see also Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. at 381
(stating that reinstatement may be delayed due to the fact that the strike may have had a negative
impact on both overall production levels and the number of total jobs).
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In 1939, in NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., the Court further
diminished workers' rights by holding that the rights of strikers under the
Wagner Act were outweighed by the property interests of the employer in
possession of its factory. 28 Thus, the Court found that sit-down strikers were not
protected from discharge. Other potentially effective tactics, such as work slowdowns 29 and "quickie" or partial strikes, 30 have also been declared unprotected
against employer retaliation. Even anti-employer propaganda-in the form of
handbills distributed to enlist community support for collective bargaining
agreements- have been held unprotected
where the handbills did not disclose
31
that labor disputes were ongoing.
As for the plight of African-American and other minority group
workers, the Wagner Act said nothing. 32 Although Congress failed to address
race discrimination in employment, the Supreme Court did impose a duty of fair
representation on unions if federal labor legislation protected the unions' status
as the workers' representatives. In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co., the Court held that a union could not use its position as an exclusive
bargaining representative under the Railway Labor Act to force the discharge of
black firemen, who were employees in the unit represented by the union, but
who were not allowed to become union members due to their race.33 However,
in Emporium Capwell v. Addition Community Organization,the Court held that
black workers could be discharged for allegedly trying to "end run" their union
when they sought to negotiate with their employer over the discriminatory
working conditions they faced.34

28.

NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).

29.

Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 336-39 (1950).

30.
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm'n, Lodge 76, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
31.

NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).

32.
David E. Bernstein, Only One Place of Redress: African-Americans, Labor Regulations,
and the Courts from Reconstruction to the New Deal (2001) (making the surprising claim that
African-American workers were better off without New Deal social legislation). For a critical
review of David Bernstein's thesis, see Davison M. Douglas, Contract Rights and Civil Rights, 100
Mich. L. Rev. 1541 (2002), which argues that Bernstein overstates certain effects of labor market
regulation on economic opportunity for African Americans, while understating the significance of
other, highly influential factors, like unequal education, pervasive racism, and the poverty that
followed centuries of enslavement.
33.
323 U.S. 192, 199 (1944); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953)
(holding that the duty of fair representation applied to unions covered by the Wagner Act).
34.

Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
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If history shows inadequate judicial protection of workers' collective
rights, the treatment of individual workers' claims can be seen as equally
dismal. Though modified in many ways, the prevailing rule of individual
employment remains the at-will rule. 35 A clear articulation of the at-will
employment rule comes from the 1967 decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 36 In Forrer,the plaintiff had been
promised a permanent job if he returned to work full-time as the manager of the
hardware department of a Sears store. Relying on this assurance, the plaintiff
sold his stock of hogs and cattle, rented his bam to a neighbor-all at a lossand placed his farmland in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's feed-grain
program.37 After four months of working at Sears, Sears discharged him without
cause. 38 The Wisconsin Supreme Court described the at-will rule as follows:
"Generally speaking, a contract for permanent employment.., amounts to an
indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of either party, and a discharge
without cause does not constitute a breach of such contract justifying recovery
of damages., 39 Although the dictionary defines "permanent" as "lasting or
intended to last or remain unchanged indefinitely, ' 4° the court instead defined
"permanent" in such a way as to mean "impermanent.' 4 1 Obviously,
"impermanent" means the exact opposite of "permanent," or more specifically,
"not permanent." This is an absolute contradiction that, by comparison, makes
the distinction in Mackay Radio between being discharged and being
permanently replaced seem almost robust. It is not as if the courts define all
contracts--even those of indefinite duration-to be terminable at-will. For
35.
The "American Rule" of at-will employment is usually traced to Horace G. Wood, A
Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant § 134 (1877), which discusses the American "inflexible"
rule that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will). But see Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment-At- Will Rule, 20 Am. J. Legal Hist. 118 (1976) (describing the
development of American conceptions of the master-servant relationship); Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment-At-Will Rule Revisited, 23 Ariz. St. L.J. 733 (1991) (responding to
Freed and Polsby by arguing that debates over employment at-will must be argued within the
context of the modem world); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of
"Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 Ariz. St. L.J. 551, 558 (1990) (claiming that the "employment-at-will
rule was the natural offspring of a capitalist economic order reflecting the value of individualism,
the growth of competition, and the mobility of labor").
36.

153 N.W.2d 587 (Wis. 1967).

37.

Id. at 588.

38.

Id.

39.
Id. at 589. The actual holding of the case is that the promise of permanent employment
was not breached by the employer so there was no claim, based on the promise, for recovery by
promissory estoppel.
40.

The New Oxford American Dictionary 1273 (2001).

41.

153 N.W.2d at 590.
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example, in Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distributorsv. Drewrys Ltd., U.S.A., the
court held that a beer distributorship contract with no definite term could be
canceled only upon reasonable notice.42 The claim of an employee that he was
promised "permanent" employment would seem to justify more protection than
the beer distributorship contract which stated no term and seemed to operate
indefinitely. Oddly, though, the courts appear to value beer distributors as
entitled to more legal protection than employees.
Not only is the at-will rule at odds with what people would normally
expect when they are told they have permanent jobs, it is also at odds with the
employment laws of most other countries. Neither Canada nor Mexico, our
partners in NAFTA, follow the at-will rule. 43 Nor does Japan, or any of the
countries in the European Union (including the United Kingdom). 44 The at-will
rule is truly an example of American exceptionalism. The principal academic
defender of the at-will rule, Professor Richard Epstein, explains that the at-will
rule is valuable to the employee as well as the employer:
The reason why these contracts at will are effective is precisely that
the employer must always pay an implicit price when he exercises
his right to fire. He no longer has the right to compel the employee's
service, as the employee can enter the market to find another job.
The costs of the employer's decision therefore are borne in large
measure by the employer himself, creating an implicit system of
between employer and employee against employer
coinsurance
45
abuse.

In other words, the alternative employment opportunities available to
an individual employee-her ability to enter the labor market and find a jobare the only limits on employer abuse over and above the transaction costs of
finding a replacement. Putting the at-will rule of individual employment
together with the Mackay Radio rule of collective action 46 means that American
workers, individually and collectively, are only protected to the extent that they
are in demand by other employers. From the perspective of the individual
employee who is not represented by a union, the calculation as to whether she
should quit is determined by the demand for individuals like her in the labor

42.
Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distrib. v. Drewrys Ltd., U.S.A., 129 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa
1964).
43.
Int'l Labor Law Comm'n, Am. Bar Ass'n, International Labor and Employment Laws
21-5, 22-11 (William L. Keller ed., 1997).
Id. at 1-23, 32-9.
44.
45.
Richard Epstein, In Defense ofthe Contract-At-Will, 51 U.Chi. L. Rev. 947, 973 (1984).
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
46.
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market. She can be successful negotiating with her employer to improve her
situation only if she has good prospects for finding a job elsewhere.
Collectively, unions and their members are really only protected in the exercise
of their statutory right to strike if the labor market is strong for persons with
their qualifications. In these situations, the employer will have great difficulty in
permanently replacing the strikers and is thus more likely to yield in collective
bargaining.47
But what should be done in a weak labor market, where the supply of
potential workers is high and the demand low? Whether individually or
collectively, the answer is that the employee or groups of employees have to put
up with their present employment because they lack a ready alternative source
of employment. Professor Regina Austin has powerfully demonstrated that
where the at-will rule governs, the level of protection available to employees, at
least under the common law, is the tort of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.48 Given that it is difficult to prove intentional infliction of emotional
distress, workers in a weak labor market are required to tolerate quite a bit of
abuse before they become entitled to common law protection. Thus, in a weak
labor market, employees are left to "suck it up" and endure abuse by their
employers, because that is the "least bad" employment choice they have.
Relying on the free market also causes inequality in wealth and
earnings. An extreme disparity between the wealth and income of the rich and
the poor currently exists in the United States. 49 This is not without its social
consequences. Once a threshold of development has occurred in a country,
studies have shown that as inequality increases, the health of its citizens
decreases:
In the developed world, it is not the richest countries which have the
best health, but the most egalitarian .... Looking at a number of
different examples of healthy egalitarian societies, an important
characteristic they all seem to share is their social cohesion ....
These societies have more of what has been called "social capital"
which lubricates the workings of the whole society and economy.
There are fewer signs of anti-social aggressiveness, and society

47.
Presumably, even in a relatively weak market for workers, workers acting collectively
will have an advantage over any individual because of the greater difficulty an employer would
have in replacing a group all at once, rather than individual by individual.
48.
Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of EmotionalDistress, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
49.
See Paul Krugman, For Richer: How the Permissive Capitalism of the Boom Destroyed
American Equality, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2002 (Magazine), at 62 (describing the "new Gilded Age"
in America marked by an ever-widening gap between rich and poor).
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appears more
caring. In short, the social fabric is in better
s
condition. o
Death rates are higher in the more unequal societies because physiological and
psycho-social causes afflict the comparatively poor with greater frequency than
they do the wealthy. Where there is less inequality, these phenomena are less
prevalent:
Although all of the broad categories of causes of deathcardiovascular diseases, infections, respiratory diseases, cancers,
etc.-seem to be related to income distribution, the most strongly
related are social causes such as alcohol-related deaths, homicides,
and accidents. These causes are highly suggestive of the effects of
social disintegration . . . . [Tihere is a large body of evidence
demonstrating that various forms of psychosocial stress can have a
powerful influence on death rates and rates of illness .... [T]here is
increasing evidence of the physiological channels through which
51
chronic stress can effect endocrine and immunological processes.
As discussed above, employees working under the "suck it up" rule (because
they cannot find other employment) are often subject to employer abuse. This
abuse causes stress for the individual which, as the foregoing demonstrates, can
be very harmful to one's health.
II. WHY SYMPATHY FOR VICTIMS OF DISCRIMINATION HAS DECLINED
As we begin to look at discrimination law, I hope I have demonstrated
that the United States has created a legal regime of employment that shows a
general lack of sensitivity for and protection of employees. My point is not to
conclude that the victims of employment discrimination should accept what
they get and expect no better. Rather, I hope to use this situation as a baseline
from which a coherent approach can be developed to enhance empathy
systematically in the judicial system for the victims of discrimination. Before
that can be done, it will be necessary to review whether there has been a decline

50.
Richard G. Wilkinson, Unhealthy Societies: The Afflictions of Inequality 3-4 (1996).
One of the reasons that our society lacks social cohesion and tolerates inequality and its
consequences is that the majority has refused to accept the presence of people of color as full
members of the community. Of course, there may be many other reasons. Many of the more
egalitarian societies are more homogeneous than the United States. In these societies most people
can look back at their forbears as having been in their same "blood line" (e.g. French, German,
Scottish, etc.) for time immemorial. Other than Native Americans, most Americans lack this sort of
long-standing, homogenous ethnic heritage. Maybe that helps to explain our predisposition to think
that we each must make our place in this world on our own.
51.
Id. at 4-5.
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in sympathy52for victims of discrimination in the judicial system and why that
might be so.
First, a personal story: in the dim mists of the past-in the Sixtieswhen I graduated from high school, five of my friends and I borrowed one
family's station wagon for a road trip that included a run through parts of the
Old South. Before that trip, I knew of enforced public segregation and, like
many Northerners, had sympathy for its victims. But that knowledge did not
prepare me for the reality of experiencing enforced public segregation. The
issue of race and the oppression of African Americans was overpowering
whenever we were in public places. For the first time, I knew what it was to be
white. 53 Eleven years later,54 I got my first position teaching law at a school in
the Old South. By the time I arrived, it had been transformed into the New
South: all the vestiges of legally enforced segregation in public places were
gone. I soon lost consciousness of being white.
Given that I am a white male of a certain age, 55 I am in some ways a
baseline for the reaction of many judges who are now full participants in our
57
present legal culture. 56 The decision in Brown v. Boardof Education,
the civil

52.
Sympathy is defined as "feelings of pity and sorrow for someone else's misfortune." The
New Oxford American Dictionary 1720 (2001). The difference between sympathy and empathy is
that someone who is sympathetic feels sorry for a person who has suffered, while someone who is
empathetic, to paraphrase former President Clinton, "feel[s] the pain" of that person. Heidi Evans,
The Road to the White House: Clinton Finally Blows Up at "Snotty-Nosed" Critics, Seattle Times,
Mar. 27, 1992, at A3. Many majority group members of society have been, and continue to be,
sympathetic to the plight of African Americans and other victims of discrimination. In my opinion,
however, it is questionable whether many have reached beyond sympathy to empathy.
53.
See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See ": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (1993) (discussing the discriminatory
intent requirement and challenging white readers to become conscious of the "transparency" of
whiteness); see also George A. Martinez, The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican Americans and
Whiteness, 2 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 321 (1997) (discussing the legally defined race of Mexican
Americans in relation to whiteness).
I certainly sympathized with African Americans subjected to segregation. I wish I could
say that I had developed empathy. But the reality of being African American in that society at that
time seemed so extreme that it was impossible for me to comprehend. It was just too different.
54.
Among my motivations for going to law school was my respect for the Warren Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and other major civil rights cases.
55.
See generally Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives,68 Tex. L. Rev. 381, 399-406
(1989) (discussing the "cultural baggage of the white man").
56.
To understand the reaction more fully, try to get someone to review her preconceptions:
get her to play the following mind game, employing a hypothetical that is the converse of the veil of
ignorance made famous by philosopher John Rawls. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
Rather than assuming ignorance about the world, let us start by assuming all of us know the
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rights movement, and the Civil Rights Act of 196458 came amidst critical and
exciting times. But that period is long over. Now that it is, one reaction is to let
the problems of discrimination regress, leaving society unsympathetic toward
all workers, including women, African Americans, and members of other
minority groups. In a system that lacks sympathy, it is easy to articulate the
effect of antidiscrimination statutes: the at-will rule has been modified so that
either party may terminate employment at any time for a good, bad, or no
reason, but not for a discriminatory one. 59 Although reasonably activist judges
might be willing to find discrimination in certain situations under this scheme,
adopting this as the rule could lead to the assumption that, by and large, the
60
problem of discrimination no longer exists, but for the occasional bad actor.
Professor Alan Freeman made this point by distinguishing two points of view
for judging antidiscrimination law: the victim's perspective and the
perpetrator's perspective. 61 He characterized the predominant perspective as
that of the perpetrator:

condition of the world, but each of us is ignorant of our particular status in terms of race and gender.
Further assume that each person would desire as hassle-free and easy a life as possible. In the
employment discrimination classes where I have used this exercise to reach the issue of how
prevalent discrimination is, I have come to call the point of view I want the "slacker" perspective.
Doing this has prompted some interesting discussions, with much emphasis on what exactly this
"slacker" perspective means, especially in terms of commitment to civil rights and the like. In this
discussion, some students realize that they are more committed to enhancing civil rights than
perhaps they had thought they were, and expressed a greater level of support for civil rights than
they thought generally would be expressed by educated people (e.g., their fellow law students). But
once it is clear that the "slacker" perspective is the desire for a good life with as few obstacles as
possible, then I ask whether a rational person would prefer to be African American or white, female
or male. The intuitive answer is that the "slacker" would take the path of least resistance and pick
being a white male. This may help develop a reality check against which we can judge our estimates
of continuing discrimination and the level of our potential empathy for the victims of
discrimination.
57.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

58.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).

59.
See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (holding that Title VII
protects all races, including whites, against race discrimination). Although Title VII protects
members of all races against race discrimination, it falls far short of requiring employers to have
good cause for taking adverse action against all workers. European law provides good cause
protection generally, while U.S. law protects everyone against some forms of discrimination but
does not provide general good cause protection. See Bob Hepple, European Rules on Dismissal
Law, 18 Comp. Lab. L.J. 204, 220 (1997).
60.
Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, in The Politics of Law: A
Progressive Critique 121, 124-26 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
61.

Id.
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Its concern is with rooting out the behaviors of individual bad actors
who have engaged in "prejudicial" discriminatory practices .... Its
job is to isolate and punish racial discrimination viewed as an
instance of individual badness in an otherwise nondiscriminatory
social realm .... A corollary of this fault principle is that those who,
under applicable legal doctrines, are not labeled perpetrators have
every reason to62believe in their own innocence and noninvolvement
in the problem.
The background assumption about the prevalence of discrimination may well
influence a judge or a jury member in evaluating a case presented to him or her
for decision.
Even more limiting than the perpetrator perspective
articulated by conservative author Dinesh D'Souza. His view is
Americans are the cause of their own problems; any discrimination
is a rational response by the majority to the dysfunction of
American culture. 63 He writes:

is the view
that African
against them
the African

The End of Racism refutes the widely shared belief that racism is the
primary explanation for black failure in the United States today. I
argue that the main problem faced by blacks is neither deficient IQ,
as suggested in The Bell Curve, nor racial discrimination, as alleged
by Jesse Jackson and other civil rights activists. Rather, the book
contends that African Americans have developed a culture that was
an adaptation to historical oppression that is, in several important
respects, dysfunctional today. I point out that some pathologies, such
as extremely high African American crime rates, have the effect of
legitimizing "rational discrimination....64
This view supports an even narrower role for the application of antidiscrimination law than the perpetrator assumption. Employing this assumption,
antidiscrimination law should allow for "rational" discrimination.
At least one court appears to have adopted a variant of this "rational"
discrimination line. In EEOC v. ConsolidatedService Systems,65 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered an employment discrimination case
concerning a Korean-owned business. In support of its case, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) offered evidence that seventythree percent of those who applied to, and eighty-three percent of those who

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 125.
Dinesh D'Souza, The End of Racism, at xiii (1995).
Id.
989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993).
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66
were hired by, Korean-owned Consolidated Service Systems were Korean.
This despite the fact that less than one percent of the total workforce in Cook
County was Korean.67 Nevertheless, the court found that the evidence was
insufficient to prove the defendant discriminated against non-Koreans, as the
disparity likely resulted from the owner's reliance on word-of-mouth recruiting
by current employees who were mostly Korean:

If an employer can obtain all the competent workers he wants, at
wages no higher than the minimum that he expects to have to pay,
without beating the bushes for workers-without in fact spending a
cent on recruitment-he can reduce his costs of doing business ....
Of course if the employer is a member of an ethnic community,
especially an immigrant one, this stance is likely 68to result in the
perpetuation of an ethnically imbalanced work force.
The court found that the employer's use of passive recruiting was rational for
two reasons:
The first is that an applicant referred by an existing employee is
likely to get a franker, more accurate, more relevant picture of
working conditions than if he learns about the job from an
employment agency, a newspaper ad, or a hiring supervisor. The
employee can give him the real low-down about the job .... Second,
an employee who refers someone for employment maZ9 get in trouble
with his employer if the person he refers is a dud ....
This use of the concept of rational discrimination is not as pernicious
as D'Souza's claim-that discrimination against African Americans is rational
because African Americans cause their own problems. But it does reveal that,
according to the Court in Consolidated Service Systems, simple economics
trumps the right to be protected against discrimination. That position surely is
not consistent with sympathy, much less empathy, for the victims of
discrimination.
The Supreme Court, in its recent structural, non-Eleventh Amendment
state sovereignty cases, has adopted the theme that discrimination is rational.7 °

66.

Id. at 235.

67.

Id.

68.

Id.

69.

Id. at 236.

70.
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which largely sought to prevent State targeting and
discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs, was an unconstitutional encroachment on "rational"
state action); see also United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (invalidating elements of
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In Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama v. Garrett,71 the Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that Congress lacked the power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA),72 because disability classifications are subject only to
rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes. Although the ADA would
require state employers to reasonably accommodate individuals with
disabilities, their failure to do so would be rational discrimination, and therefore
lawful: "[W]hereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional)
for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees
who are able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to 'mak[e]
existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities.' 73 This unsettling conclusion fuels skepticism
concerning the Court's approach towards antidiscrimination law.
Professor Jed Rubenfeld has uncovered what he claims to be an antiantidiscrimination agenda among five of the Justices on the current Supreme
Court.74 Rubenfeld compared Court jurisprudence across a number of areas
within constitutional law to find an explanation that is consistent when applied
to each of them. 75 His analysis involved juxtaposing the Court's affirmative
action decisions with decisions in areas such as congressional power under both
the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,76 recent
Eleventh Amendment cases,77 and the decision in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale.78 In doing so, Rubenfeld found that the only way to put these cases
together into a coherent whole was to see them all as advancing an antiantidiscrimination agenda. He writes:
The anti-antidiscrimination view need not openly contest
"traditional" antidiscrimination law. It can embrace the idea that
everyone should have equal opportunities regardless of race, sex,
creed, or color. But it is hostile to the more "radical" extensions of
the Violence Against Women Act on the grounds that institutional bias in state prosecutions of
gender-motivated violence is insufficient to demonstrate irrational discrimination in the operation of
state laws or proceedings).
71.

531 U.S. 356 (2001).

72.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12,112-117 (2000).

73.

531 U.S. at 372 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,112(5)(B), 12,111(9) (2000)).

74.

Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-AntidiscriminationAgenda, 111 Yale L.J. 1141 (2002).

75.

Id. at 1143.

76.

Id. at 1147-48.

77.

Id. at 1148-52.

78.
530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the free expression right of private association trumps
state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual preference).
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antidiscrimination law, especially those that seek to protect
traditionally unprotected groups, extend antidiscrimination ideas to
unusual contexts,
or push the law beyond the principle of formal
79
legal equality.
Professor Rubenfeld's masterful job of juxtaposing the Court's jurisprudence
across all these areas persuasively documents his thesis, even in the absence of
any direct expression of the anti-antidiscrimination agenda by any member of
the Court.
The Second Circuit has been more direct in its expression of ennui
when faced with the possibility that the law protected so many groups against
discrimination. In Fisherv. Vassar College, ° Judges Jacobs and Leval, writing
for six members of the court sitting en banc, concluded that proof of a prima
facie case of individual disparate treatment discrimination
[does] not necessarily support a reasonable inference of illegal
discrimination. In our diverse workplace, virtually any decision in
which one employment applicant is chosen from a pool of qualified
candidates will support a slew of prima facie cases of discrimination.
The rejected candidates are likely to be older, or to differ in race,
religion, sex, and national origin from the chosen candidate. Each of
these differences will support a prima facie case of discrimination,
even though a review of the full circumstances may conclusively
show that8 1 illegal discrimination played no part whatever in the
selection.

While purporting to be reviewing the full circumstances of the case, the court
was actually taking the case away from the fact finder, overturning a finding for
the plaintiff.
Other academic commentators have noted the shift in attitude by
federal judges toward a narrower view of the problem of discrimination in our
society. For example, Professors Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson have
demonstrated that the "lack of interest" argument-that the shortfall of women
and minority men in various jobs reflects their lack of interest in those jobshas increasingly resonated with federal judges, regardless of whether they are
Democratic or Republican appointees. They write:
During the 1965-89 period as [a] whole, the courts have required sex
discrimination plaintiffs to meet more difficult standards of proof
than race discrimination plaintiffs to refute the lack of interest
79.

See Rubenfeld, supra note 74, at 1143.

80.

114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).

81.

Id. at 1337.
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argument. Since the late 1970s, the courts have also changed their
approach to the lack of interest argument in race discrimination cases
to one less favorable to plaintiffs. They have moved toward a
conservative understanding of racial segregation that converges with
the way they have always understood sex segregation in employment
... . That this conversion occurred among judges of all political
affiliations . . . suggests a significant transformation in judicial
consciousness. After [the first] decade of efforts to enforce Title VII,
federal judges apparently began to share the general public's belief
that emplonent discrimination against minorities had been largely
eradicated.
In her criticism of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 3 an employment
discrimination case involving race, Professor Deborah Calloway argued that the
Supreme Court had revised its underlying assumption about the pervasiveness
of discrimination:
Hicks is significant, not for its narrow legal holding, but for the
attitude underlying that holding . . . . [T]his case is about what
evidence is sufficient to meet the plaintiff's burden of persuasion on
discriminatory intent. What evidence makes it "more likely than not"
that the defendant discriminated? The answer to this question
84
depends on one's beliefs about the prevalence of discrimination.
Additionally, Professor Deborah Malamud critiqued district court judges' use of
summary judgment to dispose of individual disparate treatment cases without
allowing plaintiffs to have a trial, 85 as have Professor Ann McGinley 86 and
87
Professor Kenneth R. Davis.

82.
Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical
Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases ChallengingJob Segregation, 59 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1073, 1180-81 (1992).
83.

509 U.S. 502 (1993).

84.
Deborah Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic
Assumption, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 997, 1008-09 (1994).
85.
Deborah Malamud, The Last Minuet: DisparateTreatmentAfter Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev.
2229, 2237 (1995).
86.
Ann McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 203 (1993) (arguing that the
current trend of using summary judgment erodes the role of the fact finder in employment
discrimination cases).
87.
Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment
DiscriminationCases, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 703, 753 (1995) (arguing that, in marginal cases, summary
judgment decreases the likelihood that plaintiffs will get beyond the first step of the test the
Supreme Court developed for proving discrimination in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
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More recently and very tellingly, Professor Michael Selmi compared
federal courts' dispositions of employment discrimination cases with those of
insurance cases, among others.8s At the pretrial stage, plaintiffs were much less
likely to be successful in employment discrimination cases than in insurance
cases-ninety-eight percent of discrimination cases were decided for defendants
as compared with sixty-six percent of insurance cases.8 9 At trial, plaintiffs had a
slightly lower success rate in employment discrimination cases. 90 Most startling,
however, was the difference in outcome between cases tried before judges and
those tried before juries:
Plaintiffs [in employment discrimination cases] are .. .half as
successful when their cases are tried before a judge than a jury, and
success9 1rates are more than fifty percent below the rate of other
claims.

These statistics show that judges are much more hostile toward
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases than are juries.92 This is so
despite the commonly accepted belief, at least by the white majority, that
discrimination is no longer prevalent. The 2001 Pulitzer-Prize-winning book
compiled by correspondents of the New York Times, How Race is Lived in
America: Pulling Together, Pulling Apart, reports the result of a public opinion
poll that asked the following: "Just your impression, are blacks in your
community treated less fairly than whites on the job or at work?, 93 Seventythree percent of whites said that African Americans were not treated less fairly
than whites,
while only forty percent of African Americans reached that
94
conclusion.

U.S. 792 (1973). The first step requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
by showing that she is part of a protected group, that she was qualified for the job, and that she did
not get the job while someone else did.).
88.
Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases so Hard to Win?, 61 La. L.
Rev. 555 (2001) (showing the lower courts' hostility to employment discrimination cases as
compared to insurance and personal injury cases, based on plaintiff success rates).
89.

Id. at 560.

90.

Id.

91.

Id. at 560-61.

92.

Id.

93.
The New York Times Poll on Race: Optimistic but Enduring Racial Division, in How
Race is Lived in America: Pulling Together, Pulling Apart 365, 385 (N.Y. Times ed., 2001).
94.
Id. at 385; see also, Kaiser Family Found., Pub. No. 3143, Race and Ethnicity in 2001:
Attitudes, Perceptions, and Experiences (2001), available at http://www.kff.org/content/
2001/3143/RacialBiracialToplines.pdf (reporting similar disparities between perceptions of whites
and African Americans about equal treatment on the job).
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This data shows that, like judges, members of the public adopt the
perpetrator, or "bad actor," perspective. Yet a jury is two times more likely than
a judge to find for a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination. 95 Although
this astounding statistic might be explained by the fact that stronger plaintiffs'
cases usually go to juries, while weaker cases are tried before judges as fact
finder,96 it is also important to note that jury members are always charged, by a
judge, to decide the case before them based solely on the evidence in the record.
As a result, they may be less likely than judges to act on preconceptions about
the prevalence of discrimination in general. Jurors may set aside these
preconceptions when they take on the unusual and important civic duty of
deciding a case. 97 Judges, meanwhile, may treat any particular discrimination
case as just one more in a long line of cases on the docket that need to be
handled as efficiently as possible.98 They may not focus as intensely on each
case, the record of evidence in it, and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from that evidence.
95.

Selmi, supra note 88, at 560-61.

96.

Id. at 559.

97.
See Todd E. Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts and Jury
Nullification, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 467, 472 (2001). Todd Pettys describes how a jury proceeds in
deciding a case as follows:
No one acquainted with the dynamics of the courtroom will quarrel with the
claim that jurors generally want to do what they believe is morally right, that
jurors are most likely to be persuaded when they are told a compelling story,
and that a trial lawyer must be attuned to jurors' beliefs and expectations.
Every good trial lawyer knows, for example, that she maximizes the
likelihood of victory if she tells the jurors a credible story that makes them
feel morally compelled to return a verdict for her client.
Id.
98.
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the PersonalInjury Damage Award, 19 Ohio
St. L.J. 158, 178 (1958). Professor Harry Kalven describes the difference in the approach of judges
and juries:
The judge and jury are two remarkably different institutions for reaching the
same objective-fair, impersonal adjudication of controversies. The judge
represents tradition, discipline, professional competence and repeated
experience with the matter. This is undoubtedly a good formula. But the
endless fascination of the jury is to see whether something quite differentthe layman amateur drawn from a wide public, disciplined only by the trial
process, and by an obligation to reach a group verdict-can somehow work
as well or perhaps better.
Id. For a description of the value of the jury system, see Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must
Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence,68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
183 (2000).
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III. How TO GET JUDGES TO EMPLOY "SYSTEMIC EMPATHY" IN CASES
INVOLVING VICTIMS OF DISCRIMINATION

Returning to the dichotomy set by Professor Freeman, he suggests that
the dominant perpetrator or occasional bad actor perspective must be replaced
with the perspective of the victims of discrimination. Freeman describes his
recommendations as follows:
Central to the victim perspective is an insistence on concrete
historical experience rather than timeless abstract norm. For black
Americans, that experience has been one of harsh oppression,
exclusion, compulsory reduced status, and of being perceived not as
a person but as a derogatory cultural stereotype. Years of oppression
have left their mark in the form of identifiable consequences of
racism: residential segregation, inadequate education, overrepresentation in lowest-status jobs, disproportionately low political power,
and a disproportionate share in the least and worst of everything
valued most in our materialistic society ....The victim perspective
focuses on the persistence of conditions traditionally associated with
racist practice . . . If [racist practices] exist in virtually identical
form
after antidiscrimination laws have9 9 prohibited racial
discrimination, the law has not yet done its job.

Refocusing discrimination toward the perspective of the victim seems
like a daunting task. Brown v. Boardof Education, the Civil Rights Movement,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the aggregate seem to be a relatively brief
moment in the long history of judicial insensitivity to the rights of workers
generally, and of the victims of discrimination specifically.10 0 Adding to the
difficulty of the task is the relatively recent negative reaction against our socalled "victimization culture." The gist of the complaint is that by
characterizing ourselves as all being victims of one sort or another, we
collectively reject personal responsibility for our lives, and instead blame our
plight on society. At its core, it is a claim that our culture has become so
narcissistic, that we have become so focused on ourselves as woebegone
individuals in need of treatment or deliverance, that we have precluded concern
for others and for society.' 0 ' In contrast, the goal of developing "systemic

99.

Freeman, supra note 60, at 124-25.

100.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (2000).
101.
For a strong statement of this position, see Charles J. Sykes, A Nation of Victims (1992),
which argues that the American culture of victimization encourages people to use personal
resentments to their social advantage and avoid personal responsibility. For a less ideological
approach, see Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (1991),
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empathy" is to develop general concern for those who have been treated the
worst over time. Rather than leading to an atomistic society of separated,
helpless individuals, this should lead to a cohesiveness greater than any we have
experienced in the past. Thus, developing "systemic empathy" for the victims of
discrimination is the antithesis of victimization as it has come to be used, as an
inward-looking sense of powerlessness and helplessness. Establishing a culture
of "systemic empathy" will be empowering for all.
After this gloom and doom, there is still some hope on the horizon; I
hope that it is more than just a slender reed. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., the Court, in a unanimous decision, exposed litigation of
individual disparate treatment cases to more intense scrutiny of the evidence in
the record, and to the inferences of discrimination that could be drawn from that
evidence.' 0 2 This new approach replaced an increasingly formalistic and
formulaic approach that resulted in many good cases being thrown out of court
or on judgment as a matter of law
on summary judgment before going to10 trial,
3
after a plaintiffs victory before a jury.
There were two parts to the Reeves decision. First, the Court rejected
the so-called "pretext-plus" rule. 0 4 This rule required that a plaintiff introduce
additional evidence of discrimination, even after having proven a prima facie
case of discrimination, and after demonstrating that the defendant's asserted05
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was illegitimate. 1
The approach underlying the "pretext-plus" rule was to "slice and dice" the
evidence in the record that supported the plaintiffs case until there was not
enough left to go to trial or to uphold a verdict if the case was tried.' 0 6 Thus, the
evidence that proved a prima facie case was dropped from the record once the
defendant introduced evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged
decision. 10 7 Testimony of discriminatory statements made by defendant's
decision makers were excluded from the record if it did not meet the strict

which asserts that the current discourse on rights has hindered the development of political debate
by focusing on individual rights, not focusing on the correlative duties that rights entail, and
ignoring the need to balance particular rights.
102.

530 U.S. 133 (2000).

103.
See Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & DicingIndividual DisparateTreatment Law, 61 La. L.
Rev. 577 (2001) (contending that lower courts have continued to be skeptical of victims of
discrimination).
104.

Id. at 587-88.

105.

Id.

106.

Id. at 585.

107.

Id. at 587-88.
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standards of "direct" evidence of discrimination, even08though the testimony was
obviously circumstantial evidence of discrimination. 1
Second, in reviewing the evidence in the record, the Court indicated
that the court of appeals should have drawn every inference that could be drawn
in support of the jury's verdict. 10 9 Because of the operation of the misguided
"pretext-plus" rule, the Court found that the Fifth Circuit had in effect given
only lip-service to the rule by misapplying it in two significant ways. First, "the
court disregarded critical evidence favorable to [Reeves]-namely, the evidence
supporting [Reeves's] prima facie case and undermining [Sanderson's]
nondiscriminatory explanation."' 10 Second, the "court also failed to draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of (Reeves].""' In addition to the unchallenged
evidence of a prima facie case, the evidence included the age-based comments
of the one superior, Chesnut, and the evidence that Chesnut was the actual
decision maker behind Reeves's firing:
[W]hile acknowledging "the potentially damning nature" of
Chesnut's age-related comments, the court discounted them on the
ground that they "were not made in the direct context of Reeves's
termination." And the court discredited petitioner's evidence that
Chesnut was the actual decision maker by giving weight to the fact
that there was "no evidence to suggest that any of the other decision
makers were motivated by age." Moreover, the other evidence on
which the court relied-that Caldwell and Oswalt were also cited for
poor recordkeeping, and that respondent employed many managers
over age 50-although relevant, is certainly not dispositive .... In
concluding that these circumstances so overwhelmed the evidence
favoring petitioner that no rational trier of fact could have found
that petitioner was fired because of his age, the Court of Appeals
impermissibly substituted
its judgment concerning the weight of the
112

evidence for thejury's.

To emphasize the seriousness of the Fifth Circuit's blunder, the Court found
13
that no retrial was necessary and that the original verdict should be reinstated.'

108.

Id. at 583-84.

109.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).

110.

Id.

111.

Id.

112.
Circuit).
113.

Id. at 152-53 (emphasis added) (quoting decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Id. at 153-54.
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In Reeves, the Court did not go the final step and say that a showing by
the plaintiff of a prima facie case plus sufficient evidence to dismiss the
employer's stated non-discriminatory reason would "always be adequate to
sustain a jury's finding of liability." ' 1 4 The Court concluded that sometimes,
despite plaintiffs evidence, "no rational fact finder could conclude that the
action was discriminatory."1" 5 Justice Ginsburg concurred, and indicated that it
should be "uncommon" for a case to be taken from the jury where the plaintiff
introduced evidence sufficient to support a finding of a prima facie case and
reject the defendant's explanation. 1 6 This should happen only if "it is
conclusively demonstrated, by evidence the district court is required to credit on
a motion for judgment as a matter of law that ...discrimination could not have
been the defendant's true motivation."' 17 Because of the effect that Reeves has
on both summary judgment and on post-verdict motions for judgment as a
matter of law, more cases should be submitted juries than were prior to the
Reeves decision. In addition, more jury verdicts for
plaintiffs will likely stand
8
despite motions for judgment as a matter of law."l
Rejecting the "pretext-plus" rule and requiring that a case be focused
on the evidence in the record, and inferences be drawn from that evidence, are
important steps toward the development of a more empathetic approach to the
victims of discrimination. 1 9 Together, the two principles operate to direct
federal judges away from the formalistic, rule-driven approach to
discrimination, one that largely works to the disadvantage of the victims of
discrimination. Instead, judges should shift their attention toward review of the
evidence in the record and the inferences that can properly be drawn from that
evidence.
IV. CAN REEVES BE USED TO EDUCATE JUDGES?

In my view, the two variables set forth in Reeves--evidence of
discrimination and the inferences to be drawn from that evidence--can be used
to develop "systemic empathy" for the victims of discrimination. The dictionary
114.

Id. at 148 (emphasis in original).

115.

Id.

116.

Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

117.

Id. at 154-55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

118.
Charles F. Thompson, Jr., Juries Will Decide More Discrimination Cases: An
Examinationof Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 26 Vt. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
119.
For my earlier efforts atexplaining Reeves, see Zimmer, supra note 103 (concluding that
Reeves "goes a long way to putting the law of individual disparate treatment back on track as a
functional method to help remedy discrimination").
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defines "evidence" as "the available body of facts or information indicating
whether a belief or proposition is true or valid." 12 "Inference" is defined as "a
conclusion reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning."' 21 "Reason" is "the
power of the mind to think, understand, and form judgments by a process of
logic.' 22 Some contemporary evidence theorists add imagination as a crucial
part of the process of drawing inferences based on evidence. 123
Is there evidence that discrimination remains a problem significant
enough to justify a victim's perspective-an empathetic point of view-by
federal judges? Professors Alfred W. Blumrosen and Ruth G. Blumrosen have
undertaken a major study that offers insight into this matter. In designing their
study, they decided to use data from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's EEO-1 Form, a form documenting workforce demographics that
24
employers with over fifty employees are required to submit annually.'
Looking at the data from 1975 through 1999, the authors found some good and
bad news. First, the good news was that minorities and women had made
significant gains in employment since 1975. Although the whole workforce
grew during this period, the proportion of women and minority men in the
workforce grew as well.
The bottom line
is that minorities increased their proportion of
the EEO-1 Labor Force between 1975 and 1999 by more than 4.6
million workers. These Minorities were 57% Black, 27% Hispanic,
9% Asian and .2%Native American. The net inflow of minorities in
the EEO-1 Labor Force was an additional seven million workers,
nearly doubling the minority labor force of 1975.
Women increased their proportion of the EEO-1 Labor Force by
nearly 3.8 million workers. The net inflow of women was an
additional 9 million women, more than doubling the female labor

120.

The New Oxford American Dictionary 589 (2001).

121.

Id.at 869.

122.

Id. at 1419.

123.
See, e.g., Vern R. Walker, Theories of Uncertainty: Explaining the Possible Sources of
Error in Inferences, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (2001) (explaining how jurors derive conclusions
from evidence that may be incomplete or conflicting).
124.
Alfred W. Blumrosen & Ruth G. Blumrosen, The Reality of Intentional Job
Discrimination in Metropolitan America-1999, at http://www.newark.rutgers.edu/-ronchen/
blumrosen-eeo.html (2002). The EEO-1 Form requires that private employers with one hundred or
more employees compile gender, race, and ethnicity information about their employees, as
mandated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2002). The purpose of the form is to
assist the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in ensuring that employers are not engaged
in unlawful employment practices. Id.
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force of 1975. The women workers were 69% White,
17% Black,
5
9% Hispanic, 5%Asian and 1%Native American.1
More important than increasing their density in the workforce, women and
members of minority groups "increased their share of 'better jobs' as officials,
managers, professional, technical and sales workers.' 26
The bad news starts with the fact that one third of the employers who
were legally obligated to file EEO-1 Forms failed to do So.127 Presumably,
employers not willing to provide the information have reason to fear disclosure.
That group no doubt includes many of the most persistent discriminators.
Proceeding to their methodology, the authors reviewed the data
submitted by employers from over 160,000 establishments within common
metropolitan areas. 28 They next analyzed the representation of women and
minority men holding jobs in common occupational areas by using the binomial
distribution technique approved in Hazelwood School District v. United
States.1 29 The limitations of the study-excluding establishments with fewer
than fifty employees and excluding employers not within any "Metropolitan
Statistical Area"--meant that fewer than half of all employees were covered by
the study.1 30 But based on the comparison of the establishment of individual,
though unidentified, employers against their peers in the same industry and
metropolitan area, the study nonetheless found that considerable discrimination
persisted:
For 1999, 75,793-or 370 /--of establishments discriminated against

Minorities in at least one occupational category. This discrimination
affected 1,361,083 Minorities who were qualified and available to
work in the labor markets, industries and occupations of those who
discriminated. These Minorities were 57% Black, 27% Hispanic, 9%
Asian and .2%Native American.
For 1999, 60,425-or 29%---of establishments discriminated against
Women in at least one occupational category. This discrimination
affected 952,131 Women who were qualified and available to work
in the labor markets, industries and occupations of those who
discriminated. Women were 69% White, 17% Black, 9% Hispanic,
5%Asian and 1%Native American.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Blumrosen & Blunirosen, supra note 124, at 26.
Id. at xvi.
Id.
at 1.
Id.
433 U.S. 299 (1977).
See Blunirosen & Blunirosen, supra note 124, at 29.
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A "hard core" of 22,269 establishments appear to have discriminated
over a nine year period against Minorities, and 13,173
establishments appear to have done so against Women. This "hard
for roughly half of the intentional discrimination
core" is responsible1 31
we have identified.
The EEO- 1 Form data indicates that much work remains to be done to
address discrimination. It does justify, however, asking federal judges to
reexamine their preconceptions about the prevalence of discrimination. At least
some judges, being convinced of the continuing gravity of the problem of
discrimination, may learn to adopt a victim's perspective in employment
discrimination cases.' 32 The challenge then is twofold: 1) to gain the attention of
these judges; and 2) to get them to reevaluate their preconceptions in their daily
discrimination
work-the job of deciding actual cases, such as employment
33
ones--during the pre-trial, trial, and post-trial settings.1
My proposal is to declare a new Civil Rights Movement, at least in the
courts. 134 Some large-scale employment discrimination cases have already had
35
One notorious
an impact on perceptions of the prevalence of discrimination.
case involving Texaco was settled after a great deal of negative publicity about
the company.' 36 More recently, Coca-Cola settled a massive class action case

131.

Id. at 74. "Hard core" discriminators were defined as employers:
[S]o far below average in an occupation that there is only one in one hundred
chances that the result occurred by accident (2.5 standard deviations [versus
the 2 standard deviation or 5%chance standard used in Hazelwood]) in 1999
and in either 1998 or 1997, and in at least one year between 1991 and 1996,
and was not above average between 1991 and 1999.

Id. at 95.
It would be very optimistic to assume that all judges are educable.
132.
133. Appellate judges reviewing the actions of trial judges also need to adopt a more
empathetic perspective.
134.
A renaissance of a more general Civil Rights Movement would likely be the most
effective means to heighten federal judges' sensitivity once again towards the problems of
discrimination and the difficulties faced by the victims of discrimination.
135. See Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the
Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 389 (2002) (looking at
employment discrimination cases from the viewpoint of corporate governance and what the
response of corporate directors ought to be).
136. See Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, on Tape, Discussed Impeding a Bias Suit, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 10, 1996, at Al. For the terms of the ultimate settlement of the case, see Court TV
Legal Documents, Texaco Settlement Agreement, at http://www.courttv.con/legaldocs/
business/texaco/settlement.htmi (last visited Apr. 23, 2003); see also Roberts v. Texaco, 979 F.
Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (documenting the final settlement agreement).
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brought by black employees alleging discrimination in promotions,
compensation, and performance evaluations. 13 7 Other impact litigation against
major employers is pending. 38 So far these cases have not been described as
part of a reinvigorated Civil Rights Movement, whereby the battle is taken to
the courts, but such a conceptualization might help increase their weight in
society. Describing them as an element of a campaign for justice and equality
at these cases, the
can affect the way all Americans, including judges, look
39
problem of discrimination, and the status of its victims. 1
Because statistical evidence is a major element supporting the
proposition that discrimination is a continuing problem worthy of a sensitive
and empathetic approach by judges, a useful strategy would be to bring more
systemic disparate treatment cases. 4 0 These cases would be based on statistical
proof demonstrating patterns and practices of discrimination by employers. 14 1 If
many of the "hard core" discriminators identified in the abstract, but not named
by the Blumrosens' study, were sued successfully in systemic disparate
treatment cases,142 the overall amount of discrimination would decline (or at

137.

Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Ga. 2001).

138.
See Deborah Durham-Vichr, Microsoft Lawsuit Pits Johnnie Cochran vs. Bill Gates,
Newsfactor Network, at http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/8718.html (Apr. 5, 2001) (reporting
on a racial and sexual discrimination suit being brought against Microsoft Corporation); Robert
Luke, Heavy Hitters: Bias LitigationInvolves Taking Big Risks for Big Rewards, Atlanta J.-Const.,
Aug. 4, 2002, at IC (discussing the risks of class action bias cases and highlighting those currently
in litigation).
139.
There has recently been a considerable attempt to undermine the significance of the
federal courts in the Civil Rights Movement and, therefore, in the social change that resulted from
that movement. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (1991). Gerald Rosenberg focuses his
analysis beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), but fails to see that
Brown was one of a long series of cases litigated by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which
developed a strategy for challenging the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896). See Jack Greenberg, Litigation and Social Change: Methods, Limits and Role in
Democracy 16-23 (1974) (summarizing the litigation efforts of the NAACP up to and including
Brown). The long-term litigation strategy gave the issue of racial equality an official forum outside
the African-American community. The interaction of the ongoing litigation and civil rights groups
brought about what we now call the Civil Rights Movement, culminating in the March on
Washington and Dr. Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech. Taking the federal courts out
of this would have changed the story enormously and, perhaps, would have changed its ending as
well.
140.
See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 989 (1991) (showing the comparatively few
systemic cases among all the employment discrimination cases brought in the federal court system).
141.

Id.

142.
See I Charles A. Sullivan et al., Employment Discrimination: Law and Practice §§ 3.01.07 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the general approach to proving systemic disparate treatment
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minimum its victims would be vindicated). Similarly, statistical evidence of
discrimination is at the core of proving systemic disparate impact
discrimination. Convincing statistical evidence would bring discrimination to
the attention of the courts at a broad level. 43 The presence on the docket of a
considerable number of systemic cases would help undermine the perpetrator
perspective of judges and make them more receptive to the idea that
discrimination remains a considerable problem deserving their closest and most
exacting scrutiny. This might even tend to develop empathy among judges for
the victims of discrimination, empathy that would carry over to all the
discrimination cases on their dockets, from individual disparate treatment cases
to suits for retaliation and harassment.
Even in individual disparate treatment cases, statistical evidence at a
fairly general and abstract level can prove useful though it does not by itself
prove that the plaintiff in any particular case was discriminated against. 144 There
is support for the proposition that such non-individualized evidence is useful in
45
individual disparate treatment cases. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
the Court indicated that a broad range of evidence is admissible to prove
pretext. This includes proof of the defendant's "general policy and practice with
respect to minority employment. On [this] point, statistics as to petitioner's
employment policy and practice may be helpful to a determination of whether
[defendant's] refusal to rehire [plaintiff] in this case conformed to a general
pattern of discrimination against blacks. ' 46 Just as the employer's own
statistics are relevant to an individual disparate treatment case, statistical
evidence demonstrating the general problem of discrimination
is relevant in
147
order to put the particular facts of a case into context.
An expanded scope of relevance for the admissibility of statistical
evidence, including evidence of the prevalence of discrimination in society and

discrimination).
143.
See id. §§ 4.01-09 (providing the general approach to proving systemic disparate impact
discrimination).
144.
That an employer has "bad" statistics does not mean that it discriminated against this
plaintiff. So, too, an employer with "good" statistics may have in fact discriminated against the
particular plaintiff.
145.

411 U.S. 792 (1973).

146.
Id. at 804-05 (footnote omitted). The Court may have cut back on this aspect of
McDonnell Douglas in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), where, in
discussing the remand for proof of pretext, neither the majority opinion nor the two dissenting
opinions mentioned statistical evidence.
147.
"Bad" statistics support the inference that the employer discriminated in plaintiffs case,
while "good" statistics do not support that inference.
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at the defendant's place of employment, would aid the judge or the jury in
drawing the appropriate inference of whether or not the defendant discriminated
in the plaintiff's case. In Old Chief v. United States, 14 1 the Court, in an opinion
by Justice Souter, described the breadth of inference-drawing:
[Evidence] has a force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and
as its pieces come together a narrative gains momentum, with power
not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of
jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, to reach an
honest verdict. This persuasive power of the concrete and particular
is often essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations
149
A syllogism is not a story ....
that the law places on them ....
The scope of relevant evidence also stretches to evidence that satisfies
the expectations "about what proper proof should be.' 50 Justice Souter states:
[T]here lies the need for evidence in all its particularity to satisfy the
jurors' expectations about what proper proof should be. Some such
demands they bring with them to the courthouse, assuming, for
example, that a charge of using a firearm to commit an offense will
be proven by introducing a gun in evidence. A prosecutor who fails
to produce one, or some good reason for his failure, has something to
be concerned about.' 51
The ideas a judge or jury have about the prevalence of discrimination
are expectations that need to be established or, where they are wrong, need to be
confronted with evidence. Studies like the Blumrosens' should be admissible
for confronting the prevailing bad actor or perpetrator perspective regarding the
prevalence of discrimination. Finally, expert testimony can be useful to help
educate judges, and juries, as to the nuances of discrimination.' 52 Although its
holding was controversial, the Supreme Court, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
upheld the introduction of an expert witness to analyze the language used by the
defendant's decision makers. 53 Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist and
psychology professor, testified that based on the overt sex-based comments as
well as even gender-neutral remarks of some decision makers, the partner

148.
519 U.S. 172 (1997) (finding that the prejudicial effect of prosecutorial evidence of prior
written statements of criminal defendant as to his thoughts and acts outweighs its probative effect).
149.

Id. at 187, 189.

150.

Id. at 188.

151.

Id.at 188.

152.
Typically, an expert statistical witness is used to prove systemic cases based on
statistical evidence. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
153.

490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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' 54
promotion process of defendant was "likely influenced by sex stereotypes."'
Such testimony is55relevant because it helps the fact finder draw inferences based
on the evidence.

V. CONCLUSION

In the exercise of their craft, judges need to develop more empathy
towards the victims of discrimination. While a social movement similar to the
1960s Civil Rights Movement would likely influence judges' willingness to
exercise empathy, something less dramatic and difficult to achieve might
nevertheless yield positive results. A mini-Civil Rights Movement in the
courts-undertaking more systemic cases and using expertise to help draw the
inference of discrimination-may prove useful for developing a more
empathetic federal judiciary.

154.

Id. at 235.

155.
Experts are not always necessary. In his 1992 campaign for the presidency of the United
States, Ross Perot spoke at the NAACP National Convention. His use of the phrase "your people"
did not require the testimony of an expert to decipher its meaning. See The Reform Party-Ross
Perot: Political Timeline, at http://www.cnn.con/ALLPOLITICS/1996/conventions/long.beach/
perot/political.timeline.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
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